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PART H
This is the concluding portion of a two-part note
dealing with the disclosure implications of the Texas
Gulf Sulphur decision. PartI, which appeared in the
January, 1969, issue of the ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW,* dealt with Texas Gulf as an "insiders case"
and analyzed the standards of materiality and public
dissemination promulgated therein. Part II will be
limited to a discussion of the legal problems posed by
the court's disposition of the press release and stock
option issues.
The historic decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.' has taken
anti-fraud securities regulation one step closer to being a "federal
corporation law."
While the court's expansive standards of
materiality and its strict approach to the concept of insider
trading violations under SEC rule lOb-5 2 will certainly pose
serious problems of compliance for corporate officials, it is the
disposition of the press release issue which "transcends in public
importance" all other aspects of the monumental Texas Gulf
Sulphur litigation. The court's determination that negligently
conceived but misleading releases are proscribed by the rule has
stirred considerable controversy, and raises the further question
of whethEr injured investors will be able to secure relief in private
damage actions predicated on the same negligence standard. Finally,
the Second Circuit's finding of anti-fraud violations by officers
and directors of TGS who accepted executive stock options
without disclosing material, non-public information to the Board
of Directors or its issuing committee raises critical questions relating to the application of rule lOb-5 to intra-corporate affairs
* Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur: Expanding Concepts of Corporate Disclosure Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 43 ST. JOHiN's L. Rxv. 425 (1969).

' SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), petitions for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Jan. 3, 1969) (No.
897) (defendant Coates), 37 U.S.L.W. 3264 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1969) (No. 937)
(defendant Kline).
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
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and transactions.
The concluding segment of this note wil
analyze these prominent issues in light of the correlative burdens
which the decision will undoubtedly create for the corporate and
financial communities.
THE

GORDIAN KNOT OF TEXAS GULF SULPHUR: THE IMPOSITION
OF CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT RELEASES AND REPORTS

UNDER RULE

10b-5

The facts underlying the press release issue are substantially
uncontraverted; on April 12, 1964, the Texas Gulf Sulphur
Company (TGS) released a statemehlt to the press purporting
to give the progress to date of its mineral exploration activities
in Timmins, Ontario.3 Apparently, the company, in order to
protect potential purchasers of TGS stock, considered it wise
to comment upon unauthorized rumors concerning the Timmins
project which had begun to circulate in Canada and New York.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), contending
that the release "painted a misleading and deceptive picture of
the drilling progress at the time of its issuance

. .

." in violation

of SEC rule l0b-5(2),1 sought "a permanent injunction restraining
the issuance of any further materially false and misleading publicly
distributed information items." -

3 For a detailed account of the facts which precipitated the issuance of
the release see Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur: Expanding Concepts of Corporate Disclosure Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 425, 43233 (1969). The release read, in pertinent part:
'Most of the areas drilled in Eastern Canada have revealed either
barren pyrite or graphite without value; a few have resulted in discoveries of small or marginal sulphide ore bodies.
'Recent drilling on one property near Timmins has led to preliminary
indications that more drilling would be required for proper evaluation
of this prospect. The drilling done to date has not been conclusive,
but the statements made by many outside quarters are unreliable and

include information and figures that are not available to TGS.
'The work done to date has not been sufficient to reach definite conclusions and any statement as to size and grade of ore would be premature and possibly misleading. When we have progressed to the
point where reasonable and logical conclusions can be made, TGS
will issue a definite statement to its stockholders and to the public....'
401 F.2d at 845.
4 Rule lOb-5 (2) reads, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . (2) To make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
5 401 F.2d at 857-58.
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The press release issue can be viewed from three equally
significant perspectives. The first involves the court's explicit
effort to modify the effect of the statutory phrase "in. connection
with the purchase or sale of any security", and raises the question,
in reference to corporate disclosure responsibilities, of whether
or not a corporation as an entity can violate rule lb-5 though
neither it nor any of its agents engages in a related securities
transaction. Secondly, assuming that the "in connection with"
clause has been satisfied, there must be an examination of the
standards by which the corporation's conduct should be judged;
here, the Texas Gulf Sulphur court adopted a somewhat revolutionary approach, holding that, at least with respect to a
suit for equitable or prophylactic relief, liability could be imposed
for misleading releases which had been negligently conceived.
Lastly, in what is certainly the most critical and far-reaching
determination of all, it must be ascertained whether a similar
standard shall be imposed in a suit for monetary damages predicated
upon identical facts.
Erosion of the "in connection with" requirement
Essentially, the "in connection with" clause serves to define
that conduct which is capable of falling within the broad
proscriptions of fraud delineated in the substantive clauses of
rule lOb-5; in this sense, it is somewhat analogous to a procedural predicate. In the context of the private damage action,
the requirement delimits those classes of persons who shall have
standing to sue under lOb-5; with respect to administrative or
enforcement proceedings initiated by the Commission, it circumscribes the situations which shall be subject to regulation. At
the very least, the phrase appears to demand that there be some
sort of significant connection between the alleged violation and
a securities transaction.
Originally, and especially in the private sphere, the "in
connection with" clause was given a strict interpretation, even
to the point of requiring some "semblance of privity" as a
prerequisite to any private action premised on lOb-5 fraud.6
However, it was soon recognized that, in order for the rule to
function efficiently on the open market and remain faithful
to the "investor protection" philosophy of the federal securities

6Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952), wherein the
complaint was dismissed because the defrauded purchasers bought the stock
in question after the defendants had completed their sales and thus could
not satisfy the privity requirement which the court considered necessary.
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acts, the statutory phrase must be more liberally construed.7
Illustrative of this trend is Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co.,8
in which the court ruled that, in light of the broad language
of the statute and the overriding purpose of the rule to protect
investors, the proscribed activity should not be limited to that
portion of a transaction which involves an exchange of consideration but rather should extend to the entire transaction aimed
at defrauding a purchaser.9
Similarly, in. Miller v. Bargain
City, U.S.A., Inc.,10 wherein the "semblance of privity" requirement was explicitly rejected, Judge Lord, speaking for the court,
vividly expressed his belief that Congress' attempts to endow
the securities acts with a broad remedial effect would be unjustifiably subverted by engrafting upon the law a limitation
which was neither a part of the statute nor any governing
common law tort principles.'
Moreover, like considerations
flowing from the "investor protection" orientation of the securities
acts led an Illinois district court to hold in Freed v. Szabo Food
Service, Inc.' 2 that a lOb-5 plaintiff, alleging reliance upon a
misleading statement concerning the securities involved, purchase
of such securities from some source as a result of such reliance,
and consequential damages, can bring an action against a third
7See, e.g., Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th
Cir. 1962); Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956); Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966);
Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964);
Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
Freed v. Szabo Food Serv., Inc., CCI FED. SEC. L. REP. [1961-1964
Transfer Binder] f91,317 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 1964) ; Pettit v. American
Stock Exch,, 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Cochran v. Channing Corp.,
211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Bucholtz v. Renard, 188 F. Supp. 888
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
8226 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
9Id. at 978. See also Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215

(S.D.N.Y. 1965).

10229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964).

11Id. at 37; accord, Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239
(S.D.N.Y. 1962). See also 3 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REuLATIoN 1767-69 (2d
ed. 1961).
The Miller court also attempted to eradicate any misconceptions that a
buyer or seller could only sue the other party to the transaction in question.
Accord, Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673
(N.D. Ind. 1966); Freed v. Szabo Food Service, Inc., CCH FEn. Smc. L.
REP. [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] 191,317 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 1964); New
Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
For a detailed analysis of the declining role of privity in lob-5 actions
see A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAWS FRATT--SEC RULE lob-5 §8.5, at
205-08.1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERGI; Painter, Inside Inforination: Growing Pains For the Development of Federal Corporation Law Under
Rule 10b-5, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 1361, 1371-82 (1965).
12 CCH FE.
SEc. L. REP. [1961-1964 Transfer Binder]
91,317 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 14, 1964).
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party whose only involvement in the transaction was in making
the alleged misrepresentations.
The court in Texas Gulf Sulphur heartily concurred in the
broad construction of the "in connection with" clause wrought
by these opinions and declared such a construction to be
apposite whenever materially misleading statements or deceptive
insider activities had been uncovered. Judge Waterman, again
underscoring the Securities Exchange Act's vital purpose to protect investors against fraud, indicated that it was essential to
the efficacy of this goal that the SEC be endowed with the
power to prevent those corporate acts "reasonably likely fraudulently to injure investors", emphasizing that misleading corporate
statements could spawn such injury whether or not the corporation or its management participated in a contemporaneous
securities transaction and "irrespective of the purpose underlying
their issuance." 13 Hence, the court concluded that
Rule 10b-5 is violated whenever assertions are made . . . in a inanner

reasonably calculated to influence the investing public, e.g., by means
of the financial media . . . if such assertions are false or misleading

or are so incomplete as to mislead irrespective of whether the issuance
of the release was motivated by corporate officials for ulterior purposes.14
In other words, a deceptive press release issued in this manner
would satisfy the "in connection with" requirement even where
the company and those individuals responsible for the misleading
statements did not engage in trading activities and were not
motivated by a plan to benefit themselves at the "expense of
a duped investing public."
The court believed that their holding justifiably coincided
with the overriding Congressional purpose of providing broad
protections for the investing public through the imposition of
rules which would insure "fair dealing" in the securities market:
if Congress had intended that a defendant must engage in a
securities transaction in order to violate section 10(b) "it knew
how to make that intention clear." ' By merely inserting the
F.2d at 861. The court pointed out that
[t]he requirement that a statement may not be found misleading unless
its issuance is actuated by a 'wrongful purpose' might well have the
effect of permitting the issuers of misleading statements to seek advantage but to escape liability if the advantage fails to materialize
to the degree contemplated, or cannot be demonstrated.

13401

Id.

Id. at 862 (emphasis added).
Id. at 860. The court based this assumption on the fact that comparable provisions of the securities acts, specifically § 12(2) of the 1933
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77Q(a), and § 15(c) (1) (1964) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
14
5

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 43

phrase "in connection with", the obvious design was that "the
device employed, whatever it might be, be of a sort that would
cause reasonable investors to rely thereon, and, in connection
therewith, so relying, cause them to purchase or sell a corporation's securities." 16 To require in addition that the issuers
of the release must themselves trade or act with wrongful
purposes would certainly undermine the basic intent of the Act
since injury to the investor would be the same whether or not
these additional elements were present. Thus, with respect to a
determination of whether the "in connection with" requirement
had been satisfied, no distinctions were to be drawn between
misleading statements containing "inaccuracies caused by negligence" and those "published intentionally to further a wrongful
purpose," because the investing public would be equally injured
by exposure to false or deceptive statements in either instance. 17
The vast implications of this expansive construction of the
"in connection with" clause have already begun to evidence
themselves. Only a few weeks after the Texas Gulf Sulphur
decision was rendered, the Second Circuit reversed the southern
district decision of Heit v. Weitzen,' s which had previously
stood for a proposition directly in conflict with the Texas Gulf
Sulphur holding. In Heit the alleged misrepresentations, which
had been included in various reports, press releases, and documents
filed with the SEC and the American Stock Exchange, were
directed toward the federal government and we're not intended to
perpetrate a fraud of the type usually associated with the purchase
or sale of securities. The district court held that under such
circumstances, and absent any evidence of corporate or insider
trading, the "in connection with" requirement was not satisfied
where the plaintiff had merely purchased stock in reliance upon
the misleading statements which had been made.' 9 Reassessing
this holding in light of the principles expounded in Texas Gulf
Sulphur, the Second Circuit, in reversing, concluded that the
ulterior motive to defraud the government was irrelevant; the
§ 780(c) (1) (1964), expressly and clearly indicated that more than ari "in

connection with" requirement would be necessary to constitute a violation
thereof.
16 401 F.2d at 860.
17 Id. "It does not appear to be unfair to impose upon corporate management a duty to ascertain the truth of any statements the corporation
releases to its shareholders or to the investing public at large." Id. at
861-62.
18 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. f92,279 (2d Cir. Oct. 3, 1968), rev'g 260 F.
Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
19The misrepresentations consisted of a failure to admit that a significant portion of the defendant corporation's 1964 income was actually the
product of certain recoverable overcharges made by the company in coniiectiom with various government contracts.
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"in connection with" clause was satisfied simply because it would
be reasonable to assume that investors might rely on the material
contained in the false financial statements and, in reliance thereon,
might later buy securities issued by the corporation. 20 Heit has
not been the only decision to apply the Texas Gulf interpretation
of the clause. In a recent southern district opinion, Judge Bonsal,
specifically relying on Texas Gulf Sulphur, held that plaintiffs
had satisfied the dictates of the clause by merely alleging that
they had purchased stock in reliance upon misleading statements
filed by the defendant company.21 Moreover, a similar result
was reached by the same court where purchases were allegedly
made in reliance upon material misrepresentations made by three
of a defendant corporation's directors in a speech delivered before the New York Society of Security Analysts for the purpose
of inducing the2 2 securities dealers to promote the sale of the
company's stock.

If a speech delivered to a limited audience of financial experts is capable of satisfying the "in connection with" requirements under the Texas Gulf Sulphur standards, it is conceivable
that the words "in a manner reasonably calculated to influence
the investing public" may eventually be so loosely construed that
it will be difficult to hypothesize a communications medium that
will not satisfy the "in connection with" requirement. While
the implications of such a conclusion may seem rather vast,
it appears that an expansive interpretation of the "in connection
20CCH FED. SEC. L. REiP.

92,279, at 97,338 (2d Cir. Oct. 3, 1968).

It should be noted that the district court decision in Heit had previously
been distinguished by the same court which rendered it. See SEC v.
North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
wherein it was held that if the report in question is in effect a "selling device", the "in connection with" requirement might be satisfied even
though the defendants were not involved in the actual sale of stock. Here
the false and misleading statements constituted such a device since they
were specifically intended to operate as a "persuasive weapon" in effecting
a successful distribution of the defendant corporation's shares and, in connection therewith, increase the market price of the shares in question. Id.
at 129-30.
Moreover, an Illinois district court had seriously questioned the validity
of the Heit rationale, though the attack was premised on the fact that the
misleading statements were originally included in formal reports which were
filed with SEC which according to the court, are specifically intended to

inform the "man in the street." Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282
F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill.
1967).
21 Dienstag v. Bronsen, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 192,274 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
26, 1968) (mem.).
22 Sprayregan v. Livingstone Oil Co., CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. f92,272
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1968). Query: would a plaintiff who had merely been
persuaded to refrain from making a contemplated purchase or sale by reliance on the alleged misrepresentation also have standing to bring a 10b-5
suit under these broad interpretations of the "in connection with" clause?
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with" clause as proffered by the Texas Gulf court is the most
realistic means of ensuring the effectuation of the congressional
intentions underlying the securities acts; the protection of investors from injuries due to securities-related misrepresentation
can only become a viable philosophy if all conduct capable of
causing such injuries is brought within the scope of rule 10b-5's
proscriptions, irrespective of the considerations which may have
motivated the individuals who were allegedly responsible. However, it must be recognized that satisfaction of the "in connection
with" clause and the standard by which a defendant's conduct is
to be judged are two separate considerations, and it is quite
conceivable that negligent conduct which fully satisfies the clause
will not constitute a sufficient basis for the imposition of liability
under the rule.2 3 Hence, what standards of proof are adopted
by the courts with respect to conduct which will now bE covered
by the clause will have a great bearing upon the actual impact
which these new interpretations of "in connection with" will have
upon the overall reach of rule 10b-5.
The April 12th Press Release: Was TGS Damned if it Did and
Damned if it Didn't?
The court in Texas Gulf Sulphur readily adopted a negligence
standard of proof, noting that the company would be subject
to liability under 10b-5 for the issuance of a misleading press
release if such issuance "resulted from a lack of due diligence"
on its part. 24 However, Judge Waterman was careful to limit
his statements in this regard to the scope of the injunction
action within which the court was operating, and he thus refused
to address himself to the inquiry of whether a mere failure
to exercise due care on the part of TGS without an additional
showing of bad faith would similarly subject the company to
liability in a private damage suit. Rather, the court relied
2 5
upon its own statement in Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc.
that "[i]t is not necessary in a suit for equitable or prophylatic
relief to establish all elements required in a suit for monetary
damages . . .,,,26 holding that in an action for injunctive relief
the district court had the discretionary power to act against TGS
if it found they had issued a misleading
statement as a result
27
of their own lack of due diligence.
23 See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
24401 F.2d at 863 (emphasis added).
25384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
26 Id. at 547, quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,
375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963).
2 401 F.2d at 863.
One commentator has urged, however, that the imposition of such a standard is even improper in an SEC injunction action
on the ground that it would not help to deter the issuance of misleading
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With regard to the substantive issues posed by the April
12th press release, it must be emphasized that the court did not
decide whether the statements made were in fact misleading or
whether the company, in drafting them, actually failed to exercise
due diligence. Judge Waterman merely held that the district
court had employed the wrong criteria in determining that the
release was not false, misleading or deceptive, and proceeded
to formulate the proper standard. Discarded were the misconceptions that the defendants were to be judged on the facts
known to them at the time the release was issued and that they
would be exonerated if found to have exercised reasonable business judgment under the circumstances. According to Judge
Waterman, the touchstone was whether or not a reasonable investor, exercising due care, would have been misled by the
release; in applying this standard, the meaning of the alleged
fraudulent statements to such an investor and their relationship
to the truth were relevant considerations.
Similarly, it was
found that the trial court had failed to apply the correct legal
standard to the issue of due diligence; Judge Bonsal had improperly assumed that disclosure of all the underlying facts was
not a "viable alternative" to the "vague generalities" which
were set forth in the release. Thus, this portion of the case
was remanded to the district court for a determination under
the newly framed standards, as to whether the press release
was in
fact misleading, and if so, whether an injunction should
2
issue.

However, in delineating the standard of care applicable under
the circumstances, the circuit court clearly indicated that TGS
had failed to exercise the requisite diligence in drafting the

releases since the standard presumes that good faith will have been exercised
anyway. Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and
State of Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U. L. REv.
423, 442 (1968). See also Judge Moore's dissent in Texas Gulf where he
criticizes the negligence standard on the ground it will contravene the underlying purpose of the securities acts by deterring the dissemination of important corporate information. 401 F.2d at 882 (dissenting opinion).
It is interesting to note that TGS urged unsuccessfully in its petition
for rehearing (denied without opinion, Oct. 15, 1968) that the press
release holding violated the first amendment "by unduly restricting free
speech on matters of public interest." Petition for Rehearing on Behalf
of Defendants-Appellees, Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., et. al. at 2-9 (Sept. 20,
1968).
28
1d. Judge Friendly, in his concurring opinion, voiced his objections to
the majority's decision to remand the issue of whether a reasonable investor
would have been misled. Rather, he believed that the text of the release
(see supra note 3) and the three point drop in market price after it was
issued "in the face of press reports that would normally have led to a
large and, as matters developed, justified increase, are sufficient proof of
that." Id. at 866 (concurring opinion).
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release. The April 12th statement, while purporting to reveal the
progress of the Timmins program up to the time of issuance,
had failed to supply any specific details of the ore strike. The
company indicated only that further drilling would be required,
asserting that any statement or conclusions at that point would
be "premature and possibly misleading." 29 In the eyes of the
majority, these ambiguous general statements were totally insufficient; nothing less than a summary of the specific facts was
warranted. A specific description of the drilling progress including
a report of the basic facts known to the company at the time
of the release would have satisfied the court's standard, for it
"would have permitted the investing public to evaluate the 'prospect'
of a mine at Timmins without having to read between the lines
to understand that preliminary indications were favorable-in
itself an understatement." 30 Moreover, since an accurate and
detailed disclosure of the drilling results need not have been
accompanied by "conclusory assertions of success", neither the
desire to avoid liability for misrepresentation nor the fear of
encouraging the "rumor mill" which they intended to suppress
could justify a failure to comply with the court's standard. 31
In order to comprehend the difficulties inherent in the court's
disposition of the press release issue, their holding must be
viewed in relation to the entire problem of corporate disclosure
procedures. Judge Moore, in sharply criticizing the court's approach to this issue as "the most disturbing aspect of the majority
opinion", summarized the vast problems of compliance which he
feels will flow from the standard of due diligence which has
been adopted:
If corporations were literally to follow its implications, every press
release would have to have the same SEC clearance as a prospectus.
Even this procedure would not suffice if future events should prove the
facts to have been over or understated--or too gloomy or optimisticbecause the courts will always be ready and available to substitute
their judgment for that of the business executives responsible therefor. But vulnerable as the news release may be, what of the many
daily developments in the research and development departments of
29 The April 12th press release is quoted in pertinent part supra note 3.
30 401 F.2d at 864.
31

There was a further possibility that TGS had been negligent in

not obtaining the most current data available, although the majority admitted
that it is far from certain that reports of drilling progress over the April
10-12 weekend could have been secured before the release was issued.
Judge Friendly also could find no need for remand on the due diligence
issue since the majority had convincingly demonstrated that the release did
not properly convey the information it purported to give in light of the

fact that the negligence issue was open to full review. Id. at 866 (concurring opinion).
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giant corporations. When and how are promising results to be
disclosed. If they are not disclosed, the corporation is concealing
information; if disclosed and hoped-for results do not materialize,
the advantage of hindsight to brand
there will always be those with
32
them as false or misleading.
These remarks serve a more useful purpose than merely evincing
Judge Moore's dissatisfaction with the majority's holding as to
the TGS press release; analyzed in a broader sense, they can
be viewed as an indication of the problems of compliance which
the Second Circuit's rigid standard of due diligence may create
when applied to corporate disclosure practices in general. While
it is unlikely that the court was actually seeking to insure the
disclosure of information comparable to that required in a prospectus or registration statement, it must be conceded that the majority opinion does demand a maximum degree of detail and
description as opposed to a relatively ambiguous statement summarizing progress to date. However, while the results of the
Timmins project may have been amenable to such a standard by
April 12, 1964, what if the news to be disclosed had been
so uncertain or indefinite that it could not have been presented
in a manner which would have painted an accurate picture
of the situation to those receiving it (e.g., if the release had
been issued in November of 1963, an average investor may
very well have credited any figures revealed with more definiteness
than they deserved) ?33 Indeed, one commentator has warned that
Texas Gidfs broad standard of materiality, with the speculation
element which is implicit in it, may lead to premature disclosure
at a point when the information is not yet ripe enough to have
a clear meaning, noting that "[r]eleases of tentative information
carry the danger that they will seem either negligently

or in-

tentionally inaccurate with hindsight, thereby producing a lOb-5
violation in the other direction, e.g., an attempt to manipulate
security prices."134 The fear is that statements made during
the exploratory stages 'of a mining project, which in the eyes
of the issuer accurately reflect the progress to date, might at
a later time, e.g., after a substantial ore deposit has been dis-

32Id.
33

at 888-89 (dissenting opinion).

Under the subjective tests adopted by the Texas Gulf court, even
information which is uncertain, indefinite or highly speculative can be material; information of this sort, though it may be accurately detailed, is
often incapable of distribution in a manner which does not overstate its
predictive value. And any efforts to supply added commentary in the way
of explanation may lead to additional risks of rendering conclusory statements unwarranted at that time.
31 Bromberg, Corporate Information: Texas Gulf Sulphur and Its Tmplications, 22 Sw. L.J. 731, 743 (1968) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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covered, appear in retrospect to have been too gloomy or incomplete. Furthermore, with regard to a corporation which has
chosen of its own volition to release important information for
the benefit of investors, it might seem somewhat unfair to
impose liability for the mere "slip of a pen" or a simple failure
to properly "amass or weigh the facts", minor errors which may
also be blown out of proportion when reviewed "in the bright
gleam of hindsight".3 5
Of course, since an affirmative duty of disclosure has not
yet been imposed under lOb-5, it is conceivable that these risks
can be substantially avoided by delaying dissemination until the
information involved attains the requisite degree of certainty.
However, the insufficiency of this argument becomes readily
apparent when viewed in light of the New York Stock Exchange's
recently adopted immediate release policy, which strongly favors
the timely and adequate disclosure of all material corporate developments by listed companies to the public and the exchange.36
Of further significance is the New York Stock Exchange rule
that a frank and explicit announcement is clearly required where
rumors or unusual market activity indicate that news concerning
3
pending developments has leaked out.

7

Since, under the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934, an exchange is empowered to enforce
its own rules 38 by means of expulsion, suspension or other
disciplinary measures,
it appears that this new policy will
eliminate some of the discretion which corporations previously
0
exercised with respect to their own disclosure procedures.
Moreover, albeit no cases have been directly addressed to the
point, it is arguable that where rumors conveying a false or
misleading impression of material corporate developments begin
to circulate about the market a company might have a duty under
lOb-5 itself to affirmatively deny or clarify the unauthorized
reports.
Since implied misrepresentations, 4
silence 4 2 inac35 401 F.2d at 867 (concurring opinion).
36 NEw YORK SToCK EXCHANGE COMPANY

MANUAL,

§ A2, Part I, at

A-18; Part II, at A-22; Part IV, at A-28 (July 18, 1968).
37 Id. at Part II, at A-23.
38Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §6(b), 15 U.S.C. §78f(a) (1964).
3 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1964).
40 Also, while no implied federal civil remedy against a listed company
for violation of an exchange rule has yet been recognized, O'Neill v.
Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 770 (2d Cir. 1964), the creation of such a right was

strongly advocated in Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock

Exchange Rules, 66 COLUm. L. Rzv. 12 (1966), and federal tribunals have
left open the question whether an implied remedy might be cognizable under
federal law in certain instances, Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358
F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966).
41 Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, reaff'd on later motions,
100 F. Supp. 461 (1951), 103 F. Supp. 47 (D. Del. 1952).
42 Brennan v. Midwestern Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind.
1966); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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tion 13 and other non-verbal acts 4 clearly fall within the ambit
of the rule, the imposition of such an obligation could be
justified on an aiding and abetting rationale similar to that
de'veloped in Brennan v. Midwestern Life Ins. Co. 45 There the
court refused to dismiss a complaint against a corporation for
aiding and abetting an alleged lOb-5 violation on the part of
a brokerage firm through its failure to report the firm's fraudulent
activities perpetrated in connection with certain sales of the
company's stock. For in Brennan, the failure to act resulted
in an artificial stimulation of the market which was subsequently
exploited by the defendant corporation and several insiders. 46
Rumors (at least those purporting to convey bullish news) would
generate a similar market effect, and hence, a failure to comment
upon them might be held to constitute a similar aiding and
abetting violation of lOb-5. With respect to the "in connection
with" requirement, the Texas Gulf court's liberal construction
of that clause would apparently dispose of any conceivable problems, since the court emphasized that the limitation "intended
only that the device employed, whatever it might be, be of a
sort that would cause reasonable investors to rely thereon, and,
in connection therewith, so relying, cause thein to purchase or
sell a corporation's securities." 47 Accordingly, it could reasonably be said that an average investor might very well rely upon
an artificial stimulation or deterioration (if the news were of
a bearish nature) in the market price of a company's stock in
deciding whether or not to purchase or dispose of the security.
Furthermore, it is possible that the Texas Gulf Sulphur decision
will be construed to indicate that an affirmative duty of disclosure
may soon be imposed under rule lOb-5. In essence, such a requirement would necessitate dissemination of all material facts as they
become known, irrespective of whether there is concurrent trading
by the company or its insiders, even in the absence of a misleading
statement or some other form of deceptive action on their part. Of
4, List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965).
44 Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967);

Sprayregan v. Livingston Oil Co., CCH
Sept. 25, 1968).

FED. SEC.

L.

REP.

92,272 (S.D.N.Y.

45259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966). See also Pettit v. American
Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
46 It was alleged that since the corporation knew of the brokerage firm's
fraudulent acts but nevertheless permitted them to continue, it encouraged

an artificial buildup in the market for its own issue, and that as a result

of this stimulated market, the corporation enhanced its chances for a poten-

tial merger and certain of its officers and directors were able to obtain
large profits by selling substantial amounts of their stock in the company.
259 F. Supp. at 675.
47 401 F.2d at 860 (emphasis added).
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course, the fundamental objection to such a construction of the rule
would again be that it might fail to satisfy the "in connection with"
requirement; however, in light of the Second Circuit's broad
interpretation of the clause, it would appear that the continuous
outside trading appurtenant to the affairs of any large, publicly
held company might prove to be a sufficient connection by which
the corporation could be implicated for any, nondisclosure of a
material development.4"
However, several- commentators have
strongly urged that rule lOb-5 is not the proper vehicle for the
imposition of this continuous disclosure requirement, and that, if
an affirmative disclosure duty is warranted, affirmative measures
such as registration statements or periodic reporting should be
utilized to effectuate it. But to employ 10b-5 for this purpose
would unjustifiably subvert the equalization of bargaining position
rationale in favor of changing the rule into a mere device to
force disclosure for its own sake. 49 Moreover, the practical implications -of any continuous disclosure scheme must appear
somewhat onerous for the corporation.- Conceptually, proper compliance would demand an unheralded commitment to the process
of dissemination; the technical problems involved in drafting and
distributing the information and insuring its widespread publication would be overwhelming. Thus, while the imposition of
such an affirmative obligation is a distinct possibility, it is one
that will certainly be unwelcomed in the business community.
The above developments serve to accentuate the importance
of ensuring that the due diligence standard adopted by the Texas
Gulf Sulphur court establishes fair and reasonable guidelines
which will present no critical problems of compliance. Although
certain risks may be posed by the standard which has been
delineated, it would aippear that these could he substantially
ameliorated by, sticking close to the facts and allowing them to

4s Where the information withheld is of the "bad news" variety, could
it not be argued that a stockholder in the company, had he been aware of
such information, might have disposed of his interests? Similarly, a shareholder who had sold stock in the company while news of a somewhat
optimistic development was being concealed might not have acted if he had
been informed of the development at the time of his decision. Further,
consider the outside investor who would have purchased stock in the company had the concealed information been available to him. In effect -each
of these individuals has relied upon the nondisclosure as an indication that
the status quo of the corporation's activities was being maintained, and, so
relying, structured his securities transaction accordingly. Even the fairness
element so often stressed in 10b-5 situations is implicit in this rationale; the
hope is that the stockholder (or potential stockholder) will not trade at a
price which inaccurately reflects the true value of the security.
49See, e.g., BROMBERG §7.4(6)(b), at 182; Ruder, supra note 27, at 443.
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speak for themselves,"0 and by stressing three fundamental elements in all disclosures-accuracy and adequacy, promptness, and
breadth of dissemination. 5 ' If a company is completely honest
with respect to the actual discoveries which have in fact been
made, and the release does not proffer gross generalizations or
statements which are unnecessarily overcautious, the risks to
which the company'is exposed should be minimal.5 2 And it
must be reemphasized that corporations are merely being asked
to diligently ascertain the truth of all information conveyed to
the investors whose interests they supposedly manage and are
in a position to protect, and thus it does not appear unreasonable
to require that they exercise a proper degree of care in the
dissemination of such information to avoid a confrontation with
the Commission.5 3
50 Bromberg, supra note 34, at 743.

Professor Bromberg suggests that

the following safeguards should be employed to satisfy the Texas Gull
standard: 1) give the date and perhaps the hour of the development if not
contemporaneous with the release; 2) state that the situation is in flux (if
that is so); 3) describe the kwzwn facts-in detail or summary; 4) draw
conclusions or not, according to the circumstances. Of course, problems
will also arise in connection with such a fact approach; namely that of

producing a volume of information within bounds which the media can

handle, relaying technical information that is not beyond the comprehension
capabilities of the investor, and persuading the media that dry facts are
worth publishing. Id. at 744.
51 Address by Manuel F. Cohen, Meeting of Baltimore Security Analysts
Society, Jan. 6, 1969, in CCH FED. Szc. L. REP. 177,652, at 83,420 (1969).
52 A release issued by the Gulf Minerals Co., a subsidiary of Gulf Oil
Corp., subsequent to the Texas Gulf decision, perhaps came closer to what
the court was looking for. The release read, in pertinent part:

Gulf Minerals

Co. .

.

. said it has obtained "highly significant

results," from drilling on its northern Saskatchewan uranium property. . . .
Gulf cautioned that "since only one isolated hole thus far has
shown results, the extent of the uranium mineralization can't be determined at this time."
Gulf said the test hole was drilled at an angle to a depth
of about 500 feet and a gamma-ray log showed an equivalent average
of approximately 0.6% uranium oxide in selected zones totaling 195
feet.
Gulf said that because of seasonal freeze-up in the exploration area,
drilling was halted in late October. However, the company plans "an
expanded exploration program. .... "
Wall Street Journal, Dec. 4, 1968 at 4, col. 4.
Notice the use of explicit numerical data and technical language and
that the only conclusion drawn is based directly upon these facts. It is
also interesting to note that on the day prior to the publication of the
release, Gulf Oil reached a new high for the year.
53Any fears that the judicial use of hindsight will operate against a
corporation in this regard should be dispensed with summarily, since it
must be presumed that the federal judiciary will not be deluded by such an
illusory notion in their efforts to determine the validity of the allegations
which are presented.
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The negligence standard also enhances the "investor-protection"
purposes underlying the federal securities acts since the threat of
imposing liability for a negligent press release, while it might
deter or defer some releases, would probably improve the quality
and scope of those which are distributed. Furthermore, the
standard itself must be! evaluated in light of the penalty which
is to be imposed. Here it must be understood that the injunction remedy serves primarily as a mere warning to induce
certain future behavior through the deterrence of future violations,
and this realization in itself would seem to mitigate the risks of
compliance. Moreover, it is conceivable that the district court,
on remand, will not even consider Texas Gulf Sulphur an appropriate case for the granting of injunctive relief designed to deter
future misleading releases since there is virtually no chance! that
a release as pessimistic and wholly insufficient as the April 12th
statement will be repeated. 5' Thus, it appears that while theoretically the imposition of lOb-5 liability for a negligent press
release is a somewhat radical development, the remedies accompanying the imposition of such liability are relatively empty, serving only to regulate on a prospective basis. However, the! law
which is developed in equitable or prophylatic proceedings is
often subsequently applied in criminal cases and private damage
actions, 5 and the ramifications of adopting a negligence standard
as the basis for imposing civil liability upon corporations are,
indeed, rather vast.5" Hence, the true impact of the substantive
conclusions of the Texas Gulf court with respect to the press
;release issue can not really be ascertained until it is known
whether a mere showing of negligence will be sufficient to
sustain a private damage action under lOb-5 where the fraud
alleged has been manifested through an official corporate release.

54See judge Friendly's concurring opinion in Texas Gulf wherein it is
urged that an injunction should not issue since Timmins was a "once-in-alifetime affair", the reasons for issuing the April 12th release were laudable
and the "defect was solely a pardonable one of execution." 401 F.2d at 869
(concurring opinion). See also judge Moore's dissent, in which he charged
that the issuance of an injunction against TGS four years after the violation would constitute "perpetual jeopardy" in the absence of any clear and
present danger, continuing wrongful acts or likelihood of such acts. 401
F.2d at 888 (dissenting opinion).
55 See Bromberg, supra note 34, at 737.
56 With respect to TGS itself, as early as 1966, there were 49 private
actions pending against the company and the individual defendants in the
Southern District of New York, involving at least 475 plaintiffs with damage claims totalling almost $80,000,000. 258 F. Supp. at 267 at n.1.
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Extension of the Negligence Standard to the Private Damage Suit?
The damage cases which have, to date, employed the Texas
Gulf Sulphur interpretation of the "in connection with" clause5have failed to provide an answer to the crucial question of
whether the negligence standard of proof adopted in Texas Gulf
Sulphur should be extended to the private sphere. Most of
these decisions have only passed upon the legal sufficiency of
the complaint, and therefore a mere allegation in the alternative
that the defendant had knowingly misrepresented certain facts
or bad been motivated by evil designs would provide a sufficient
basis for refusing to dismiss a complaint without ruling upon
the applicable legal standard.58 It should be recalled that the
Texas Gulf Sulphur majority opinion intentionally failed to
deal with this problem since Judge Waterman clearly limited his
discussion of negligence to the injunctive action at hand. However, five members of the nine judge court explicitly demonstrated that they were vehemently opposed to the imposition
of monetary liability for negligent corporate releases, 59 and perhaps their views are an indication of the course which will be
charted in future private actions where circumstances similar
to those faced by Texas Gulf Sulphur are encountered.
In this regard, Judge Friendly's emphatic argument that some
form of the traditional scienter requirement must be retained in
these situations was especially persuasive. He warned that if
civil liability for "negligence in the drafting of a press release
such as that of April 12, 1964" were permitted, "frightening
consequences" would result. 60 Not only would the burden of
any civil remedy fall indirectly upon those individuals who were
supposed to be the prime beneficiaries of such protection-the
common stockholders of the corporation c 1 -but also the imposition
5 See Heit v. Weitzen, CCH FFml. SEc. L. REP. g92,279 (2d Cir. Oct.
3, 1968); Dienstag v. Bronsen, CCH FED. SEc. L. RE:P. 192,274 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 26, 1968); Sprayregan v. Livingston Oil Co., CCII FED. S_:w. L. REP.
1192,272 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1968).

58 E.g., Sprayregan v. Livingston Oil Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.

92,272,

at 97,310 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1968), wherein it was alleged that the defendant had knowingly and intentionally failed to disclose the materially

adverse financial information which had been suppressed.
59 Judge Friendly outlined his position in Part II of his concurring opinon, with which Judges Kaufman and Anderson both concurred. 401 F.2d
Judge Moore and Chief Judge Lumbard
at 866-70 (concurring opinions).
did not even believe that the "in connection with" requirement had been
satisfied by the TGS release. 401 F.2d at 881-86 (dissenting opinion).
1o 401 F.2d at 866 (concurring opinion).
Bromberg has criticized Judge Friendly's reasoning here
61Professor
for its failure to take note of any rights the company might have against
the officers who prepared the release, which would undoubtedly be exercised
by the shareholders through derivative suits if the company failed to take
proper action. Bromberg, supra note 34, at 739. Also relevant to the
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of such liability would seriously undermine the recent efforts of
the. business and financial communities to increase the flow of
vital corporate information to the investing public. The threat
of large money judgments would certainly intensify any risks
which would be posed by Texas Gulf Sulphur's due diligence
standard and might therefore have the debilitating effect of forcing
corporations to remain silent whenever it was legally possible
to do so. 62

The validity of Judge Friendly's remarks must be assessed
in light of the recent trend in the federal courts to eliminate
scienter as a required element of proof in private suits under
rule 10b-5.63- Although a showing of scienter (evidencing either
an intent to deceive or knowledge of the! alleged falsity) was
critical to the establishment of a cause of action in common
law fraud, 64 it was recognized at an early date that many
of the traditional common law fraud concepts would not be
relevant for purposes of 10b-5 litigation since the rule was not
intended as a mere device to facilitate the extension of federal
jurisdiction to common law fraud cases involving securities. 65
Rather, in view of the fact that Congress wished to ensure a
broad rather than restrictive application of the federal securities
laws, 66 rule 10b-5 was enacted as a broad remedial provision
aimed at a variety of misleading and deceptive activities, whether

question of whether liability can be shifted from the company to the individual wrongdoers are exculpation or indemnification provisions which
might be included in the corporate charter.
62 With reference to those cynics who might question Judge Friendly's
analysis on the ground that it advocates a "special concern" for the corporate defendant, it would seem that an emphasis upon general considerations of fairness to the investing public would adequately justify the conclusion reached. See Ruder, supra note 27, at 449 & n.121.
63See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 961 (1968); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965);
Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962). But
see Richland v. Crandall, 262 F.2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Parker v. Baltimore Paint & Chem. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 267 (D. Colo. 1965); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
These latter decisions apparently represent a substantial though rather
unpersuasive minority. Hendricks v. Flato Realty Investments, CCH FED.
SEc. L. RP.
92,290, at 97,338 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 1968) (memorandum
opinion).
64 Essentially, the common law cause
of action in fraud embodied the
following elements: misrepresentation, materiality, scienter, privity, reliance,
causation and resultant damage. See W. PRossER, ToRTs §§ 100, 104 (3d

ed. 1964);

BROMBERG

§ 8.1, at 194.

See generally Note, Rule 10b-5: Elements of a Private Right of
Action, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 541 (1968).
66 SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195
(1963).
See generally Fleischer, "Federal Corporate Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1146, 1174-75 (1965).
65
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or not actionable in fraud or deceit at common law.6
In furtherance of this overriding Congressional policy, and in recognition
of the striking absence of any fraud or scienter language from
clause lOb-5(2)'s proscriptions of misstatements and half-truths, 68
the federal judiciary has generally adopted the view that it should
not be necessary to establish scienter "in any form" in order to
predicate a claim upon lOb-5.6 9 Perhaps the most explicit statement
in this regard was rendered by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
70
Circuit in Ellis v. Carter,
wherein it was explained why lOb-5(2),
construed in this manner, was a permissible implementation of
section 10(b) :
Section 10(b) speaks in terms of the use of 'any manipulative device
or contrivance'. ... It would have been difficult to frame the authority
to proscribe regulations in broader terms. Had Congress intended to
limit this authority to regulations proscribing common-law fraud, it
would probably have said so. We see no reason to go beyond
the plain meaning of the word 'any,'
71
as if it read 'any fraudulent' devices.

.

.

.

to construe the statute

It should also be noted that while certain federal courts have
sought to retain some form of scienter requirement,7 2 the decisions in that direction constitute a distinct minority of rather
unsubstantial consequence, 73 and the validity of which appears to
be somewhat questionable.

While at first glance this predominant trend would seem
to indicate that the scienter element will similarly be dispensed
with in private suits generated by the Texas Gulf Sulphur
67 Cady, Roberts

& Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961).

68 "Scieter is nowhere mentioned in lOb-5. If imported, it is by reference in clauses 1 and 3 to fraud or deceit. It plainly has no place in clause
2."
BROMBERG § 8.4, at 203 n.25.
Professor Bromberg believes that
scienter, if established today, merely serves to relax the other elements
of proof or to provide a basis for imposing a heavier measure of damages.
Id. at § 8.4, at 203.

6 See, e.g., Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Royal
Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Ellis v.
Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Kohler v. Koher Co., 208 F. Supp.

808, 823 (E.D. Wis. 1962)

(dictum),

F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963).
70291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
71 Id. at 274.
72
See, e.g., Fischman v. Raytheon
1951); Parker v. Baltimore Paint &
Colo. 1965); Weber v. C.M.P. Corp.,
Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd.,

affd uith approving dictum, 319

Mfg. Corp., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir.
Chem. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 267 (D.
242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964);

Thiele
v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
73 See Hendricks v. Flato Realty Investments, CCH FEn. SEC. L. REP,.
192,290, at 97,388 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 1968). See generally Note, supra

note 65, at 542-44, 549-50.
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litigation, a more thoughtful analysis will necessarily lead to a
contrary conclusion. In fact, it would be reasonable to predict
that the same policy considerations which led to an erosion or
elimination of the scienter requirement will now operate to establish it, in some form, as an indispensable element of proof
in litigation under 10b-5 (2).
Essentially, this prediction is
premised upon the realization that 10b-5 courts have previously
operated within a framework limited by a much more restrictive
interpretation of the "in connection with" clause than that engendered by the Texas Gulf decision and, hence, their conception of the types of conduct which would be actionable under
the rule must have been similarly restricted.
Prior to Texas Gulf, to satisfy the clause and bring the
alleged violation within the ambit of the rule, a plaintiff would
have been required to demonstrate, at the very least, that the
defendant had derived some direct benefit from his actions
or that he had participated in the allegedly fraudulent activity
for his own personal advantage.7 4 However, as previously noted,
the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur has wrought a
radically different construction of the statutory phrase wherein
the requisite connection is somewhat more abstract and intangible.
This new construction focuses upon the manipulative device usedthat it be one upon which reasonable investors would rely and
through such reliance cause them to engage in a securities
transaction-regardless of any ulterior, wrongful purposes. Consequently, the conduct considered in those decisions which have
to date relaxed the scienter requirement has been markedly different from that evidenced by the Texas Gulf Sulphur situation,
for in these earlier cases the requisite connection could only be
satisfied by misstatements and half-truths uttered in the course of
a' scheme or transaction which would eventually benefit the defendant at the expense of some innocent investor.75 Courts faced
with this form of conduct would naturally favor a negligenceoriented standard, since the threat of incurring heavy monetary
liability would certainly encourage insiders or the corporation
itself to exercise a higher degree of care in their dealings with
the investing public.
Hence, the underlying remedial intent
of the Securities Exchange Act, to ensure fair and honest market
conditions, was enhanced.
However, under the Texas Gulf construction of the "in connection with" clause, where even altruistic attempts on the part
74See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 294 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
75For example, in the Ellis case, the
was predicated charged that the defendants
that the stock to be sold carried with it
the company so that they could acquire the

allegation upon which the suit
had fraudulently misrepresented
a voice in the management of
control at stake for themselves.
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of the non-trading corporation to inform the investing public
of important developments can lead to a lOb-5 violation, the
implementation of the negligence standard will produce results
contra to those of the securities acts. Members of the business
community are likely to remain silent rather than risk massive
liability for slight errors in their disclosure procedures or understandable miscalculations in the exercise of business judgment.
Therefore, it would appear that the net effect of eliminating
scienter in these situations would be a decrease in the general
availability of material corporate information, so vital to the
market decisions of the ordinary investor, in direct contravention
of the full disclosure policies which the Second Circuit was
really trying to promote in Texas Gulf Sulphur."
Perhaps the best justification for this line of reasoning can
be found in the Texas Gulf majority opinion itself. In eliminating any misconceptions that a showing of good faith on the
part of an insider who had traded without disclosing material,
non-public information might constitute a defense under rule lOb-5,
the court stressed that a negligence standard had been adopted
in private actions "for policy reasons which seem perfectly
consistent with the broad Congressional design '. ..
to insure
the maintenance of fair and honest markets in . . . [securities]

transactions.' "77 However, as previously noted, Judge Waterman
did not include similar references to the elimination of scienter
in private actions in that portion of his opinion dealing with
the press release issue and refused to comment upon the
question of whether a mere lack of due diligence on the part
of TGS, absent a showing of bad faith, would subject the company
to liability for money damages.78 Reading these two portions of
the opinion together, it seems that Judge Waterman has in
effect admitted that the April 12th press release might not
be a proper case for the award of money damages for merely
negligent misstatements, as Judge Friendly so vehemently argued.
indeed, it would appear that the federal courts will properly
refuse to impose liability in damages under 10b-5 for negligently
false or misleading corporate disclosures and that scienter will
emerge as a critical element of proof in the private suits which
will undoubtedly be generated by the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation.

76Of course, there would he a concomitant improvement in the accuracy
of those releases which are made. But this does not really mitigate the
plight of the investor, for while "outsiders would be less often misled, they
would have more often to act in ignorance." 82 H, v. L. REv. 938, 950

(1969).

401 F.2d at 855.
7 Id. at 863.
7
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While this does not necessarily mean that as strong a scienter
requirement as existed at common law will be invoked, it does
suggest that some limiting factors must be supplied so that corporations need not fear massive liability for purely voluntary, uncalculating attempts to disseminate needed information to the investing
public in good faith. If the class of possible defendants is not to
be delimited by requiring a showing that each defendant intended
to derive some economic benefit from his conduct before a duty
of care is imposed, the applicable standard should comprehend, at
the very least, that "kind of recklessness which is equivalent to
wilful fraud."

7'

And unless such limits are imposed, corporations

will be subjected to unduly harsh burdens of compliance which will
eventually unbalance the traditional considerations of fairness in
the market place and frustrate the essential "investor-protection"
goals of the securities acts.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE STOCK OPTION IsSUE: RULE
AND CORPORATE MISMANAGEMENT

10b-5

lOb-5's Role in.the Issuance of Executive Stock Options
In recent years, the executive stock option, utilized as a form
of additional and tax-favored compensation, has emerged as a leading means of providing incentives to corporate officers and employees.80 In this context, the Texas Gulf Sulphur decision
becomes especially significant, for the court held that members of
Texas Gulf Sulphur's top management 81 violated rule lOb-5 by
accepting stock options while in possession of information undisclosed to the issuing8 2 committee which the court deemed to be
material at that time.
79See 401 F.2d at 868

(concurring opinion),

388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968).

citing SEC v. Frank,

8 See, e.g., Kennedy & Wander, Texas Gulf Sulphur, A Most Unusual
Case, 20 Bus. LAw. 1057, 1071-72 (1965).
81 In Texas Gulf Sulphur, members of "top management" included the
president, executive vice-president, vice-president and general counsel. However, it appears that it is not, the title of the positions but rather the functions
and, responsibilities attached to it that are the determining factors; those
officers who in the normal course of exercising their duties would customarily
communicate with the issuing body would likely fall within the rule's proscription. See 401 F.2d at 856. A similar duty was not imposed upon "lower
echelon" employees because they were entitled to assume that their superiors, the higher corporate officials, had passed on to the board all
pertinent information which should have been so communicated. However,
Professor Alan Bromberg, conceding that this assumption may be true as
a matter Of corporate channels, questions whether lOb-5 creates an additional, and independent, duty on lower, rank employees. Perhaps, this would
be so at least where the employees possessed information which, in fact,
had not yet been transmitted to their superiors. See BROMBER.G §4.7(2),
at 87 n.73.1.
82 401 F.2d at 857. This holding was not totally unexpected, for while
the trial court differed with the Second Circuit majority with respect to
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This notion that stock option recipients must disclose material
information to the decision-making body of the corporation issuing
the option is by no means a revolutionary concept; in fact, several
years ago, Arthur Fleischer, a noted authority in lOb-5 developments, proclaimed that the rule "clearly should be applicable where
a majority of the board of directors is either misled or not informed
by other directors or management officers regarding vital business
and financial information when issuing securities to those persons." "' The rationale underlying the imposition of such a duty is
to ensure that the board (or issuing committee) can properly
ascertain the true value of its stock in order to determine the
number of options to grant a corporate executive. Hence, in this
context, material information would probably include any favorable data "which, if known, would push the market up and make
[the] options less advantageous [to the corporation] because exercisable . . . at a higher price." s4
One critical and controversial facet of the stock option problem, left unresolved by the Texas Gulf majority, involves the
question of timing: does an employee violate the rule if he withholds material information at the time the option is granted or at
the moment it is exercised? The court clearly indicates that an
upper echelon employee, who knows that the option price (which
ordinarily reflects the market price) does not reflect certain developments which are likely to cause a substantial increment in the
price of the stock in the near future, must either divulge such
information to the granting body or, in the alternative, reject the
option. s
Perhaps, such individuals should even be subject to a
further obligation to inform the committee that this was not the
exactly which officers represented "top management," there is dictum in the
lower court's opinion supporting the imposition of such a lob-5 duty. 258

F. Supp. at 292 (dictum). The trial court's discussion of this matter is
dictum because Judge Bonsai found that the information withheld by the
option recipients was not material, and thus concluded that the duty to disclose, even if it existed, would not have arisen in the Texas Gulf Sulphur
situation.
83Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices:
The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REv.
1271, 1301 (1965).
84BROMBERG
§4.7(2), at 87 n.73.1. But see Address by Donald
Schwartz, Practicing Law Institute, Texas Gulf Sulphur Seminar, Oct. 10,
1968 (wherein it is suggested that the granting committee might have been
justified in thinking the withheld information was immaterial because, in

as much as option is a "form of compensation," the committee would want

the officer or employee to reap rewards when undisclosed facts are sub-

sequently reflected in market value).
s Prior to Texas Gulf Sulphur it had been acknowledged that the
actions of a corporate officer in possession of material, undisclosed in-

formation, who persuaded a granting body, which was ignorant of the facts,
to issue an option at the current market price, fell within the proscriptions

of rule l0b-5. See Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
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proper time to grant options, irrespective of whether they accepted
or rejected the proposed options; in other words, management
might be held liable for non-disclosure even if they were not the
eventual recipients of the options, as where their withholding of
the critical information resulted in the issuance of "cheap options"
to other employees.8 6 However, the court leaves open the possibility that under certain circumstances, an insider possessed of
material information might not be required to reveal material
information or to reject the offer but, rather, merely to refrain
from exercising the option until there has been full disclosure and
subsequent ratification by the board. Such an exception, the court
stated,8 7 might arise in a situation where rejection of the option
might lead to speculation as to the reasons for it and yet, at the
same time, disclosure to the grantors might seriously jeopardize
corporate security. s8
While Judge Moore, dissenting in Texas Gulf Sulphur, strongly opts for a rule which designates the exercise of the option as
the crucial event, s Professor Bromberg has criticized the majority's
inference that the exercise rather than the grant should be the
determining factor. He feels that this ratiocination naively ignores
the vital fact that the option price is ordinarily fixed at the then
market price. Thus, according to Bromberg, while a postponement
of the exercise of the option might cause the optionee to forfeit
short term trading benefits, it would not deprive him of long term
benefits accruing from information, which is material enough, as
in Texas Gulf Sulphur, "to move stock prices onto a higher
plateau." 90
86Judge Friendly, in his concurring opinion, suggests the imposition
of such an obligation: "Silence, when there is a duty to speak, can itself
be a fraud. . . . [Moreover] I am not at all sure that a company in the
position of TGS might not have a claim against top officers who breached
their duty of disclosure for the entire damage suffered as a result of the
untimely issuance of options. . .
87401 F.2d
88It seems

."

401 F.2d at 865 (concurring opinion).

at 857 n.24 (dictum).
very difficult to conceive of a situation where corporate
security would be so endangered by disclosure to the board (or issuing
committee) in view of their fiduciary responsibilities to the corporation.
S9Judge Moore advocates an "exercise" oriented rule as a solution to
the "difficult dilemma" in which insiders have been placed by the majority
decision under which, in his view, they are limited to a choice between
promoting speculation as to the reasons for his rejecting the option or
accepting it and risking possible lob-5 liability. He is of the opinion that
a limitation upon exercise of the option would sufficiently fulfill the dual
objectives of protecting the corporation from a sale of securities at prices
below their true value and maintaining corporate security; not only would
selling be delayed until material information had been adequately reflected
in the market price, but also a failure to exercise would be less likely to
lead to inferences that the recipient possessed crucial information than
would a failure to accept in the first place. 401 F.2d at 877-78 (dissenting
opinion).
90 Bromberg, supra note 34, at 734 n.9.
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Other factors might further complicate the situation, for if
full disclosure were made at the time of the grant but the committee nevertheless offered the option at or near the current market
price, charges of corporate waste or dilution might arise. Moreover, a lOb-5 violation might even be possible where the insider
was not in possession of vital corporation information when he
accepted the option, but was when he exercised it; for instance, an
insider who intended to allow his option to expire because the
market price had dipped below that of the option might very well
obtain information which would lift the market value above the
option price and cause him to exercise. 91
It appears that the solution to the problem involves a balancing of the various considerations; while the imposition. of the duty
to disclose at the time of the grant more fully protects the company against a sale of its securities at too low a price, imposing
the obligation at the time of the exercise better serves the maintenance of corporate security, although it is somewhat less effective
in preventing personal benefit to the insider. The court should
have considered in depth all of these conflicting notions and conclusively opted for one or the other alternatives, instead of merely
suggesting, that in certain situations it might be preferable to
define a lOb-5 disclosure obligation at the time92 a stock option is
exercised rather than at the time it is granted.
Beyond the Stock Option: lob-5 and Internal Corporate Activities
judge Waterman's disposition of the stock option issue brings
Texas Gulf Sulphur within the context of the growing controversy
surrounding the development of "federal corporation law" and the
emergence of rule lOb-5 as an effective regulator of certain intracorporate conduct. For the opinion can be read as defining under
91 Id.

02 The court refused to consider this question or make any determination with reference to it because the suggestion had not been presented to
them by either of the parties. However, in as much as the court saw fit
to interpose the problem itself, it would not have been inapposite to dispose
of the issue rather than leaving it open to conjecture.
Judge Waterman's disposition of the stock option issue was further
clouded by his failure to justify the statement that ratification of defendant

Kline's stock option by the Board of Directors after the concealed information had been fully disclosed failed to cure the violation. 401 F.2d
at 857 n.24. While Judge Friendly suggested that the Board's inability to
comprehend the illegality of the conduct prompted the conclusion that the
ratification was irrelevant. 401 F.2d at 865 n.2 (concurring opinion).
Professor Bromberg's thought on the subject is somewhat more palatable:
"the court was looking on the offense as one against the investing public
(i.e., issuance of cheap stock) rather than against the company; corporation
ratification might cure the latter, but not the former." Bromberg, subra
note 34, at 738 (footnote omitted).
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the rule a fiduciary-like obligation of disclosure to an official body
within the corporate entity. 93 Indeed, commentators have urged
that a "federal corporation law" is created wherever federal law
imposes duties upon corporate fiduciaries in connection with their
required conduct in securities transactions.9 4 However, the particular stock option problem which arose in Texas Gulf nevertheless presents an essentially ordinary lOb-5 case in the sense that
purchasers of stock in possession of material, non-public corporate
information withheld such information from the" "seller", which in
this instance happened to be the decision-making body of TGS9
More controversial questions of lOb-5's applicability to internal
corporate affairs will arise in transactions where the corporation is
actually the seller and disclosure obligations are imposed upon the
corporate fiduciaries, e.g., the Board of Directors, who are acting
on its behalf in the transaction. For example, in the Texas Gulf
Sulphur situation, if the option committee or the Board of Directors had been fully aware of all the material facts but had nevertheless granted the option at a price which did not adequately
reflect such knowledge, would the Board or committee have been
held to violate the rule? In other words, would lOb-5 have compelled disclosure to the TGS shareholders to ensure that their
interests and those of the corporate entity were sufficiently protected when the corporation's investment judgment was exercised
by the decision-making body? The essential problem here stems
from the fact that the responsibilities of corporate fiduciaries have
traditionally been defined under state law and instances of corporate
mismanagement have ordinarily been remedied through state causes
of action for waste or the use of bad judgment in the sale of
corporate assets. Hence, the federal judiciary has generally exercised great restraint in this area. The courts of the Second Circuit,
in particular, have attempted to adhere to the proclamation of
judge Hand in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.9s that lOb-5 was
aimed exclusively at fraudulent practices ordinarily associated with
the sale or purchase of securities, and was not intended to regulate
instances of management misconduct as such.97 Certainly, when
the decision making body of a corporation fails to protect the
93 See Kennedy & Wander, supra note 80, at 1071.

94 Address by Professor Donald E. Schwartz, Practising Law Institute,
Texas Gulf Sulphur Seminar, Oct. 10, 1968. See also McClure v. Borne
Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 834 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961);
Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Laz": An Assessment, 78 H-IARv. L. REv.

1146, 1163-66 (1965).

95 See Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L.
Rnv. 1271, 1301 (1965) ; Fleischer, "Federal Corporation LaZ": An
Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1146, 1163-64 (1965).
96 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).

97 Id.at 464.
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interests of the corporation or its shareholders through its investment decisions, it is conceivable that their action may constitute a
breach of a state-imposed fiduciary obligation albeit no federal law
is violated,"8 and perhaps it was felt that a policy conflict between
the developing body of federal anti-fraud law and traditional state
fiduciary responsibilities should be avoided, if at all possible. By
clearly excluding lOb-5 from this realm of regulation, the federal
courts apparently sought to eschew any unseemly conflicts which
might result from the imposition of overlapping obligations and limit
federal intervention to those instances "clearly covered exclusively
by federal statute." 99
Recent cases, however, have not been disturbed by the potential conflict and have begun to reevaluate this somewhat overcautious philosophy. Unfortunately, the law to date has been
rather discordant and inconclusive, and more often than not the
judicial decisions have failed to directly address themselves to the
problem of defining the scope of rule 10b-5 in this area in terms
of meaningful and definite standards. 100 However, it does seem
clear that before any form of internal corporate non-disclosure
can be successfully brought within the purview of lOb-5, at least
some form of deception must be alleged and proved, for many
securities fraud suits have been dismissed at an early stage because
of a failure to adequately establish this element.' 0' And while
there has been general disagreement on the question of exactly
who must be deceived, i.e., the company, the stockholders, or the
OsSee, e.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 545-46
(2d Cir. 1967); Kaminsky v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501, 504-05 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). In Kaminsky, where a motion was granted to dismiss a complaint
alleging that a corporation was defrauded because the board did not disclose an agreement to pay benefits to the family of a deceased officer, J.
Mansfield emphasized 'that rule lob-5 should not be viewed as a mandate

to the federal courts to investigate every managerial decision that may
be made.

Id. at 504.

9Kaminsky v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501, 504-05

(S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(emphasis added). Apparently, federal securities statutes should supercede
state law only where there is a direct conflict. But see McClure v. Borne

Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961),
urging that the federal securities laws, particularly §10(b)

of the S.E.A.

of 1934 (under which rule lob-5 was promulgated) provides stockholders
with a weapon to enforce many fiduciary duties. Under the McCluwe doctrine, state law would only control where it did not cut across "federal
interests receiving expression in the federal right sought to be enforced":
"[§ 10(b) is] part of a statutory scheme which had as its purpose the

creation of a new federal law of management-stockholder

relations ar/d

which, therefore, may not be subordinated to limitations . . . reflecting

state
Id. at 834.
0 0 policy in the same area."

1 See generall, Kennedy & Wander, supra note 80, at 1070-75.
Indus. Inc., [1966-1967 Transfer Binder]

101 Robbins v. Banner

CCH

FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 91,861 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1966); Carliner v. Fair

Lanes, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25 (D. Md. 1965); Barnett v. Anaconda Co.,

238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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investing public, 0 2 the most recent cases have encountered very
little difficulty in identifying the requisite deception, and, concomitantly, the federal judiciary has begun to evince a much more
liberal attitude with respect to the application of rule 10b-5 to
0 3
At
securities-related frauds within the corporate framework.1
102 The requisite deception will be most easily established where the
defrauding management is not the sole decision making body of the corporation, as where a transaction must be ratified by the stockholders or
the non-defrauding directors. It would appear that 10b-5 should clearly
apply in this situation and compel full disclosure to both groups, since
the revelation of any material information would necessarily bear upon
the final investment decision. See, e.g., Simon v. New Haven Board &
Carton Co., 250 F. Supp. 297 (D. Conn. 1966). Cf. Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff,
271 F. Supp. 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Where the board of directors is the sole decision making body of the
corporation, the courts have applied 10b-5 to require complete disclosure
to the entire board, i.e., to all those entitled to vote upon an investment
decision, even if state law stipulates that a mere majority is needed for
approval of the transaction. Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d
Cir. 1964); McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961); Kane v. Central Am. Mining & Oil,
Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Hence, deception against a single
member would amount to a lob-5 violation, the theory being that the
corporation's investment judgment is impaired when anyone authorized to
act on its behalf has been deceived. 339 F.2d at 29.
However, where all the directors are fully aware of all material
information which might bear upon the investment decision, courts have
reached markedly different conclusions with respect to lob-5 applicability.
Some have adopted the view that, inasmuch as a corporation can act
only through its decision making body, deception was impossible where all
directors had been fully informed, since their knowledge would necessarily
be imputed to the corporate entity. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d
764 (2d Cir.), aff'g 230 F. Supp. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Cohen v. Colvin.
266 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1967): Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). Others have readily held that a fraud against the corporation within the meaning of 10b-5 could occur under such circumstances. See, e.g., Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968), revg
257 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1966); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d
262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nona. Bard v. Dasho, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
See also McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 939 (1961); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F2d 195
(5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
For an analytical discussion of this problem see generally Note, Rile
10b-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases: Who Must Deceive Whom?, 63
Nw. U. L. REv. 477 (1968).
92,327
103 See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, CCH FrD. SEc. L. REP.
(2d Cir. Dec. 30, 1968) (en banc); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d
Cir. 1968); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nora. Bard v. Dasho, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Weitzen v. Kearns,
271 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60
(S.D.N.Y.
1967); Heilbrunn v. Hanover Equities Corp., 259 F. Supp.
936 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Apparently, the federal courts have recognized the
absurdity of interposing the corporate fiction between the defrauding directors and the minority stockholders-the "true owners" of any property
which might be misappropriated by the directors and, hence, the actual
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this point, then, it seems fair to agree with Professor Bromberg
that
[i]n its evolution to date, lOb-5 has become a powerful, if slightly
erratic, tool in the enforcement of fiduciary duties. It continues to
operate independently of them, as well as with them, and to be based
on parallel considerations of the unfairness of insiders' taking personal
advantage of their corporate positions. 04
Hence, while 10b-5 was not intended as a remedy for breaches
of state-imposed fiduciary obligations as such, it appears that the
rule will be utilized more frequently in this area to compel disclosure of all value-related information which is clearly material
to a corporation's investment decision before the corporate body
responsible for making the decision can lawfully exercise its authority. No longer will the federal courts remain idle in situations
where corporations are literally fleeced by overreaching insiders
simply because such conduct has been traditionally characterized
as a breach of fiduciary duties imposed under state law and hence
properly within the jurisdiction of the state courts. Apparently,
such mismanagement can also fall clearly within the ambit of 10b-5,
and where it does, the federal judiciary will not hesitate to ensure
10 5
that the rule's broad proscriptions against fraud are not violated.
Only in this way can the true parties in interest in our expanding
system of public ownership of big business be adequately protected
and the underlying objectives of the federal securities laws be satisfactorily fulfilled.
CONCLUSION

When the Texas Gulf Sulphur decision was first announced
in the summer of 1968, many feared that the free flow of corporate
information, so vital to the efficient operation of the securities
industry, would be severely stifled. It was predicted that corporate
victims of the directors' fraudulent actions. See, e.g., Pappas v. Moss,
393 F.2d 865, 869 (3d Cir. 1968). It thus appears that today most courts
would deem sufficient under lOb-5 an allegation that the defrauding directors had not fully disclosed to the shareholders all material information

bearing upon the investment decision, even if their consent to the particular transaction was not required under state law. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 192,327 (2d Cir. Dec. 30, 1968) (en banc);
Dasho v. Susquehannna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub
itor. Bard v. Dasho. 389 U.S. 977 (1967).

104 BROMBERG §4(7), at 88-88.1.
Bromberg thus concluded that l0b-5, in
derivative cases, has contributed to increased investor protection "in the

general sense of preserving their shares from value loss because of insider
abuse. Whether, or how much, it should do that, is another matter." Id.
105 Contra, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,327,
at 97,569 (2d Cir. Dec. 30, 1968) (en banc) (dissenting opinion)

(Medina, 3.).
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officials Would "freeze up" rather than subject themselves to possible liability under the broad standards promulgated by the decision. Thus, Wall Street observers waited nervously for the wells
of corporate information to dry up; however, while some overcautious legal advisors may have counselled a "policy of silence", the
early prophesies of widespread reticence failed to materialize.
06
Efforts by spokesmen for the SEC and the national exchanges
rule
construing
broadly
10
cases
recent
of
trend
the
to justify
lOb-5 apparently transformed the initial panic into a reluctant
acquiescence in the newly espoused full disclosure philosophy.
Manuel F. Cohen, former Chairman of the SEC, even predicted a
trend of increased corporate disclosures, arguing that as more
material information is made generally available it will become
easier for insiders to keep their activities above suspicion. 08
Essential to this emerging disclosure philosophy is the presumption that the uninterrupted flow of corporate information is
the key to public confidence in the securities markets and a prime
reason why stock ownership is so widespread today; hence, since
ours is basically a system of publicly owned businesses, corporations should literally "bend over backwards" to make certain that
no market advantage is created for anyone. As Mr. Cohen so
astutely noted:
the rule in Texas Gulf is not designed to compel, nor should it
result in, a 'clamming up' in the corporate community. On the contrary, it should lead to better and more timely disclosure of material
information to the public. This is an important goal for those who
believe in a healthy securities market as a comfortable repository for
public savings and a ready source for the growing needs for capital by
American industry.10 9
106E.g., Address by Manuel F. Cohen, Meeting of Baltimore Security
Analysts Society, Jan. 6, 1969, in CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. fr 77,652 (1969);
Cohen, Corporate Disclosure: Reporting for Diversified Companies,

N.Y.L.J., Oct. 30, 1968, at 1, col. 4; Haack, Corporate Disclosure: 'When

in Doubt, Disclose', N.Y.L.J., Oct. 31, 1968, at 1, col. 4.
107 E.g., SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., CCH FaD. SFc. L. REP.
f,92,325 (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 1968); Green v. Wolf Corp., CCH FEz. SEc L.
REP. 92,321 (2d Cir. Dec. 9, 1968); SEC v. Glen Alden Corp., CCH
FaD. SEC. L. REP. f92,280 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 1968); Diamond v. Oreamuno,

29 App. Div. 2d 285, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1st Dep't 1968); Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., S.E.C. Securities Exchange Act Release No.
3459 (Nov. 25, 1968).
.L08Address, supra note 106, at 83,418. Mr. Cohen contends that the
most expedient means by which a company can prevent insider violations
is to make information public as soon as it becomes material. However,
if strong corporate,, reasons opt against disclosure, the company should
maintain strict security and those persons in possession of the critical
information should be strongly warned against trading or tipping. Id. at
83,415.
09
'1

Id. at 83,419.
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However, if the federal courts do not inject into the private
actions which will follow TGS the limits needed to protect corporations from massive liability, for the issuance of negligent press
releases, they will again tend to be overcautious in their release
procedures, and, ultimately, an unwarranted conservatism will be
infused upon the securities market. Similarly, the propriety of
issuing injunctions in these situations should be carefully considered, for it would seem that where a company had affirmatively
demonstrated its good faith and the likelihood of a subsequent
misleading release was virtually non-existent, the severe threat
posed by a permanent injunction would be neither appropriate nor
necessary. Rather, the injunctive remedy should be reserved for
those companies which have exhibited a "tendency negligently to
mislead in releasing information" due either to the peculiar nature
of the firm's business or the exercise of bad faith on its part. 110
And where the issuance of an injunction is deemed proper, the
contempt sanctions :imposed for violation of the lOb-5 order should
be fairly strong, for this would appear to be the only 'reasonable
means of impressing upon the corporation the critical importance
of its exercising the highest possible degree of care in its release
procedures to the investing public.
While the Texas Gulf Sulphur decision has certainly provided
the securities industry with a "fountain of new law" under rule
lOb-5 (which, incidentally, will constitute the most crucial statement of the law in the area until the Supreme Court passes upon
the specific issues raised in Texas Gulf since the Second Circuit is,
in effect, the appellate court for the financial center of the nation""),
it has actually done much more than merely promulgate standards
and guidelines to be observed by the corporate community. Rather,
it has finally crystallized the expansive fill disclosure policy which
the SEC has been promoting over the past several years and serves
as judicial notice that the "protection of investor" goals underlying
the Securities Exchange Act will be fully effectuated. And it is
rule lOb-5 which will evidently emerge as the chief tool by which
this policy will be implemented, and through which the courts will
attempt to ensure that the investing public is dealt with fairly and
honestly by the corporate establishment.

82 HAnV. L. REv. 938, 947-48 (1969).
M.While the Supreme Court has finally spoken out on rule 10b-5 and
section 10(b) in SEC v. National Securities, Inc., CCH FF. SFzc. L. REP.
192,334 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1969), the Court took a particularly narrow approach
and did not address itself to any of the critical questions posed by the
110See

Texas Gulf Sulphur opinion.

